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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Aris's own employees testified without contradiction or dispute that Aris ceased all 
business operations on January 4, 2002, fired all of its employees, closed its doors and 
then on January 7, 2002, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent 
contractor doctors to run their own business on the Premises. Aris never again sought to 
occupy the Premises and, of course, had no reason to do so. Aris simply wanted to 
remove its equipment from the Premises. In fact, when Aris's Richard Enright 
("Enright") came to Salt Lake City on January 22, 2002 to remove Aris's personal 
property, the Doctors were still operating their business on the Premises and continued to 
do so for a few weeks thereafter. Aris never contended that it suffered damages because 
of its inability to occupy the Premises and no such damages were awarded. Instead, the 
only damages sought and awarded were for depreciation of the personal property, 
physical damage to the personal property and missing personal property. It is respectfully 
submitted that the court of appeals erred in affirming the award of treble damages for this 
personal property damage. 
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II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. WASATCH AND JDJ HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND 
PROPERLY PRESERVED BELOW THEIR ARGUMENT CONCERNING 
VACATING OF THE PREMISES. 
Aris repeats in its brief the unsuccessful arguments it made to the court of appeals 
that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the evidence and to preserve below their 
argument concerning Aris's vacating of the Premises.1 The record, however, 
demonstrates that Wasatch and JDJ have indeed marshaled the evidence and did preserve 
their argument below. 
1. Wasatch and JDJ Marshaled the Evidence. 
As it did before the court of appeals, Aris incorrectly argues that Wasatch and JDJ 
have failed to marshal the evidence. Aris wholly fails, however, to recite a single piece of 
evidence that was supposedly not marshaled or dispute with citations to the record any of 
the evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief. This failure is not surprising because all of the 
evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief comes from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses 
1
 Ironically, as discussed later in this brief [pp. 8-10], Aris also raises for the very first 
time an argument not raised before the court of appeals, i.e., that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise 
before the court of appeals or the trial court their contention that treble damages cannot be 
aiMardM&rdamM^tn nersnnal nrnneil^ 
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upon which Aris relied at trial or upon the stipulation of facts executed by the parties. 
[See R. 210-216] Indeed, all of the facts which Aris sets forth in its brief are contained in 
Petitioners' Brief, but are stated in Petitioner's Brief in even more detail most favorably 
to Aris. 
For example, Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to 
January 22, 2002. Aris has been unable, however, to point to one piece of evidence not 
contained in Petitioners' Brief. As stated above, Aris's own witnesses, Enright and his 
boss, Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), testified without contradiction that Aris ceased all business 
operations and terminated all its employees on January 4, did not pay rent and then turned 
over possession to the independent contractor Doctors to operate their own business on 
January 7. [R. 526 at 38-39; 527 at 234-237] Enright further testified that when he came 
to Salt Lake City on January 22, he wanted to remove the equipment from the Premises. 
[R. 526 at 41-43] Aris did not demand that the Doctors who were then in possession of 
the Premises vacate the Premises and Aris made no effort to reoccupy the Premises. Soto 
likewise testified that she told Wasatch's Dennis Peacock ("Peacock") that Aris was 
entitled to remove its equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 246-248] 
The failure to marshal argument raised by Aris is bereft of merit and should be 
rejected. 
3 
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2. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved Below Their Argument That Aris Vacated on 
January 4, 2002. 
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ failed to preserve at trial the argument that Aris 
vacated on January 4, 2002 and then misleadingly cites two alternative arguments raised 
by Wasatch and JDJ below with respect to vacating of the Premises. Once again, this 
argument is not faithful to the record. Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly argued before the trial 
court that Aris either vacated the Premises on January 4 or at least by February 9 when the 
Doctors vacated. For example: 
(a) Wasatch and JDJ contended in the Pretrial Order that Aris unilaterally 
terminated the Lease on January 4 and had vacated the Premises more than five days prior 
to January 22, 2002, which was the date on which Aris contended the forcible detainer 
occurred. [R. 169-170 & 176] 
(b) Wasatch and JDJ argued in their Trial Brief that Aris shut down its office and 
terminated all of its employees on January 4, allowed the Doctors to take possession of 
the Premises and failed to pay the January rent. [R. 219] Wasatch and JDJ argued that 
Aris's own testimony demonstrated that the Doctors - - not Aris - - were in possession of 
the Premises on January 22, 2002 and that since Aris had terminated all its employees on 
January 4, Aris was not in possession after that date. [R. 239-231] 
(c) In their closing arguments at trial, Wasatch and JDJ again argued that Aris 
vacated the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its employees and closed its offices: 
4 
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"The evidence at trial revealed that January 4, 2002 was the last day Aris was in 
peaceable possession of the premises . . . . Aris was not in peaceable possession on that 
date [January 22, 2002] - the terminated doctors were in possession at that time." [R. 305] 
[See also R. 529 at 558-559 & 577] 
Indeed, in his opening statement, Aris's own counsel told Judge Lewis that Aris 
shut down its business on the Premises on January 4, 2002 and that thereafter the 
independent contractor Doctors conducted their own business on the Premises. [R. 526 at 
19-20]2 Beyond that, the Statement of Stipulated Facts executed by the parties prior to 
trial indicates the same thing. [R. 212-213,1fl|l7-20] 
In fact, the uncontradicted testimony of Arises own witnesses at trial was that when 
Enright attempted to remove the equipment on January 22, Wasatch's Peacock refused on 
the basis that Aris had abandoned the Premises. [R. 526 at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 
27] 
Clearly, Wasatch and JDJ raised at trial their argument that Aris vacated the 
Premises on January 4. 
2
 If Aris is attempting to argue that Aris did not vacate because the Doctors' occupancy 
constituted occupancy by Aris, this argument does not assist its case. If such a legally baseless 
argument were accepted, Aris necessarily continued in occupancy of the Premises on January 22 
when Enright attempted to remove the personal property because at that time the Doctors were 
undeniably still in possession of the Premises using the equipment [see Finding of Fact No. 90]. 
Thus, there could not have been a forcible detainer of real estate on January 22 when Wasatch 
and JDJ refused to consent to Enright's removing the personal property, as found by the trial 
court and affirmed by the court of appeals. 
5 
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3. Whether Aris Vacated the Premises on January 4 Is Properly Before This 
Court. 
Aris narrowly construes this Court's order granting certiorari to preclude the 
argument raised by Wasatch and JDJ that treble damages cannot be awarded because Aris 
had already vacated the Premises weeks before Wasatch and JDJ refused to allow Aris to 
remove its personal property. The Order states that the issue to be determined is: 
"Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal property may 
be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(3)." The determination of that issue 
obviously has to be made based upon the facts of this particular case. Wasatch and JDJ 
have argued that treble damages cannot be awarded for damage to personal property in 
any circumstance but that at the very least treble damages cannot be awarded for personal 
property where, as in the present case, the tenant vacated the Premises weeks before the 
tenant was not allowed to remove the personal property. This issue is properly before the 
Court. 
B. TREBLE DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER THE FORCIBLE DETAINER STATUTE. 
1. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved This Argument Below. 
Aris argues for the very first time that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise before the 
court of appeals or the trial court the contention that treble damages under the forcible 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
detainer statute cannot be awarded for damage to personal property. Aris made no such 
argument before the court of appeals and this Court should, therefore, refuse to consider 
the argument. See, Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, f30, 16 P.3d 1233. Moreover, the 
record disposes of this argument. 
First, Wasatch and JDJ clearly raised this argument before the court of appeals 
both in their opening brief and their reply brief. [See Appellants' Brief at 35-36; 
Appellants' Reply Brief at 9, excerpts of which are attached hereto as Addenda A&B] For 
example, Wasatch and JDJ argued in their opening brief before the court of appeals: 
Aris did not seek restitution of the Premises at trial and no such relief was 
granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on the basis it had not been 
able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that Aris had no 
use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered 
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises. 
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute 
is a drastic remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing 
tenants of their possession of real property. The statute should be strictly 
construed. [Citations omitted] A landlord's act in withholding a tenant's 
personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining real property 
a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and 
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute 
simply does not apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of 
personal property, especially after a tenant has vacated and abandoned the 
premises. The imposition of the treble damages penalty would be even 
more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated for months 
in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability 
to occupy the Premises. [Appellants' Brief at 35-36] 
In addition, in Appellants' Reply Brief before the court of appeals, Wasatch and 
JDJ argued: 
7 
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Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do so 
by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible 
detainer statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the 
withholding of personal property. [Citations omitted] 
Wasatch and JDJ then went on in their reply brief to distinguish the two cases that Aris 
cited in its brief before the court of appeals to attempt to support the imposition of treble 
damages. [Appellants' Reply Brief at 9] 
Clearly, the treble damage issue was raised by Wasatch and JDJ before the court of 
appeals. 
Aris also raises for the first time its argument that the treble damage argument was 
not preserved in the trial court. Even if Aris could raise this new argument, Wasatch and 
JDJ clearly did preserve the treble damages issue before the trial court. [See, e.g., R. 401-
402, ffljc and e;R. 403,^5] 
For example, in its objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment, Wasatch and JDJ argued that §78-36-10 only applied to the forcible 
detainer of real property, not personal property. [R. 401, f^c] They further argued that 
"[s]ince the elements of the forcible detainer statute were not met the trebling of damages 
is not appropriate Only the damages set forth in §78-36-10(2)(a) are eligible for 
trebling, which does not include personal property or equipment. [R. 401-402, ^e] [See 
8 
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also R. 403, *(j5; R. 304 (the facts of the case do not qualify as a forcible detainer action 
and treble damages are not appropriate.)]3 
An issue is adequately preserved for appellate review if it is raised in time to give 
the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App. 367, 
117, 38 P.3d 307. In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987), the court 
stated that "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial court and 
the trial court has had the opportunity to make findings of fact or law." In Peirce v. 
Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^16, 994 P.2d 193, this Court held that the appellant adequately 
preserved issues in the trial court by raising them in a memorandum submitted to the trial 
court before it issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the case at bar, 
Wasatch and JDJ plainly raise the issue of treble damages with respect to personal 
property before the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, the 
issue was preserved for appeal. 
3
 In this connection, it should be noted that Aris's contention that it was entitled to 
recover treble damages with respect to the personal property damage was not raised until late in 
the game. In its Amended Complaint, Aris only claimed generally that it had "suffered damages, 
and continues to suffer damages" as a result of the forcible detainer of the Premises and then 
sought treble damages with respect to those unspecified damages. [R. 33, ffl[29 & 30] Aris did 
not allege personal property damage by virtue of the forcible detainer. The only personal 
property damage alleged was in the Fourth Claim for Relief for conversion. [R. 34, ]fl|37 thru 39] 
Aris did not seek treble damages with respect to the personal property damages alleged in its 
conversion claim. Nor in its trial brief did Aris expressly contend that it was entitled to treble 
damages for damage to personal property based on violation of the forcible detainer statute. [R. 
199-200] Instead, Aris argued that it was entitled to recover the personal property damages based 
upon its conversion claim and sought to recover punitive damages. [R. 201-202] It was not until 
the last seconds of its counsel's closing argument that Aris claimed briefly in passing and without 
discussion or citation of authority that it was entitled to either treble damages or punitive 
damages with respect to the personal property damage. [R. 529 at 556] 
9 
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2. §78-36-10(2) and (3) Do Not Provide for Trebling of Personal Property 
Damage. 
Aris argues that under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(2), 
damages to personal property are recoverable where the landlord has forcibly detained the 
real estate and, therefore, such damages must be trebled under §78-36-10(3). To the 
contrary, §78-36-10(2) says nothing about damage to personal property. That section 
provides: 
The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the Complaint and proved at trial. 
Each of these subsections relates to real estate. There is no such thing as the forcible 
detainer of personal property. A landlord's refusal to turn over possession of personal 
property is a conversion and is a distinct act from the landlord's forcible detainer of the 
real estate. 
Section 78-36-10(3) only provides that: "The judgment shall be entered against the 
defendant for the rent, [and] for three times the amount of damages assessed under 
Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c) " As demonstrated in Petitioners' Brief [p. 20], 
this treble damages penalty provision should be strictly construed. Because there is no 
express provision in §78-36-10(2) for recovery of personal property damages, §78-36-
10 
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10(3) should be strictly construed to prohibit treble damages for damages to personal 
property. 
Such a statutory interpretation would not, of course, leave a tenant without a 
remedy where a landlord refuses to surrender possession of personal property. The tenant 
can recover compensatory damages for conversion and can also recover punitive damages 
in an appropriate case where the landlord has acted willfully and maliciously or in 
knowing or reckless disregard of a tenant's rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-18-19. In the 
case at bar, the trial court refused to award punitive damages because Wasatch and JDJ 
did not act with a knowing or reckless indifference or disregard of Arises rights. [R. 369-
375] The trial court's refusal to award punitive damages is not surprising given the fact 
that JDJ in good faith claimed it had a right to retain the personal property based upon 
Aris's claimed abandonment of the Premises and the provisions of paragraph 20.1 of the 
Lease [Ex. 9, ^20.1; R. 526 at 41-43; R. 413; Finding No. 26] and the further fact that the 
parties were cooperating for months to attempt to lease the Premises and sell the personal 
property to a third party. [R. 527 at 164-166 & 199; R. 528 at 470-471 & Ex. 24] 
3. The Personal Property Damage Did Not Constitute Consequential 
Damages or General Damages Resulting From the Forcible Detainer. 
Judge Orme stated in his dissenting opinion that even if the personal property 
damages could be viewed as consequential damages from the forcible detainer, the 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
personal property damages could not be recovered because no general damages were 
recovered for the forcible detainer. Aris's response is telling. 
First, Aris argues that the personal property damages were not consequential 
damages resulting from the forcible detainer and that Wasatch and JDJ never made such 
an argument. [Aris Brief at 23-24] Wasatch and JDJ agree. Although Judge Orme was 
correct that even if the personal property damages were viewed as consequential damages 
they could not be recovered, the parties never argued the personal property damages were 
consequential damages and they clearly were not. In other words, the personal property 
damages were not suffered as a consequence of a forcible detainer of the real estate. The 
personal property damages found by the trial court were suffered as a result of the refusal 
by Wasatch and JDJ to surrender possession of the personal property to Aris, but, this fact 
augers in favor of Wasatch and JDJ.4 
Second, Aris argues that it suffered "harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason 
of the injury" resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises, that the personal 
property damages were the natural and proximate cause of the forcible detainer found by 
4
 Furthermore, Aris has never argued that the personal property damage constituted 
special damages resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises. Even had Aris made such a 
contention, and even if the personal property damages were incorrectly deemed to be special 
damages, Aris did not plead special damages in the forcible detainer cause of action of its 
Amended Complaint. [R. 33] A party is required to specifically plead special damages in order to 
recover them. See, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991); Graham v. 
Street, 270 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah 1954). 
12 
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the trial court so that these damages constituted general damages and that is all Aris was 
required to prove. 
This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between detainer of the real estate 
and the separate act of refusing to permit removal of the personal property. As Judge 
Orme stated in his dissenting opinion, "[i]t subverts the purpose of that long-standing 
policy favoring real estate to treble all damages in an action between a tenant and 
landlord just because forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of that litigation." 
[Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2005 UT App. 326, 
f36, 121 P.3d 24] The natural and proximate result of a landlord's forcible detainer of 
real estate is the tenant's loss of occupancy of the real estate. It was not the detainer of 
the real estate that caused the damages awarded Aris. It was the separate act of refusing 
to turn over the personal property. As stated earlier, Aris suffered no damage because of 
any loss of occupancy of the real estate. 
Aris argues in this regard that Judge Orme was wrong in stating that the general 
damages recoverable by a tenant for forcible detainer of real estate consist of the 
reasonable rental value of the Premises during the time they were forcibly detained. 
Without any authority, Aris argues that reasonable rental value is not the measure of 
damages because a tenant is not entitled to recover rent from the landlord. However, if a 
tenant is entitled to possession of real estate, the general measure of damages that a tenant 
suffers by being deprived of possession is the value of the possession. In turn, the value 
13 
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of the possession of leased premises would (absent proof otherwise) presumably be the 
reasonable rental value of the real estate. That amount is what it would cost the tenant to 
lease other comparable space? In any event, the general damages recoverable for forcible 
detainer of real estate would not be damage to personal property. 
4. There Are No Utah Cases Holding That Treble Damages Can Be 
Recovered For Conversion of Personal Property. 
Aris incorrectly argues that Utah case law supports its position that treble damages 
under the forcible detainer statute can be awarded for conversion of personal property. 
[Aris Brief at 18-20] The cases cited by Aris do not in fact support this position. 
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and 
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965). These cases are not on point because 
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord not only 
refused to allow the tenant to occupy the premises, but at the same time refused to permit 
the tenant to remove personal property. This Court simply recognized that the tenants had 
causes of action for conversion of the personal property. The Court did not hold or imply 
5
 Aris challenges Judge Orme's reliance upon Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930) 
for his general damage analysis on the basis that it was an unlawful detainer case and argues that 
Wasatch and JDJ fail to address the Forrester court's language that "'[t]he plaintiff is entitled to 
recover such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer." 
Aris's distinction is one without a difference. And, once again, the natural and proximate cause 
of an unlawful detainer or a forcible detainer of real estate is not damage to personal property. 
14 
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in either case that treble damages can be awarded against a landlord for conversion of the 
tenant's personal property. 
Aris cites for the first time King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1955). King does 
not assist Aris. In King, the landlords padlocked the premises and refused to allow the 
tenant to enter to remove its personal property after the tenant had failed to pay rent. The 
tenant sued for wrongful eviction and for conversion of its personal property. The Court 
held that the tenant had failed to prove any damages resulting from the landlords' forcible 
entry onto the Premises. No treble damages were awarded and no issue of treble damages 
was discussed. In fact, the tenant sought to separately recover on his conversion claim 
damages for the landlords' refusal to turn over the tenant's personal property. The Court 
separately discussed this issue and held that the landlords had a lien on the personal 
property for unpaid rent and therefore had not converted the personal property. Further, 
there was no conversion because there was no evidence that the landlords used the 
personal property for their own purposes. 
Similarly, Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944), relied upon by Aris, is 
unhelpful. That case did not involve any damage to personal property. While the tenant 
was away from the premises in the middle of the winter, the landlord removed all of the 
doors. The tenant continued in possession. The Court only concluded that the landlord 
had a legal duty not to enter the premises by force, that the landlord had violated that duty 
and the tenant had suffered damages. The majority opinion did not even discuss the type 
or amount of damages involved. The Court only held the trial court had not erred in 
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awarding damages for mental anguish and humiliation without assessing other nominal or 
compensatory damages. There was no discussion as to whether these damages were 
special damages, consequential damages or general damages. 
Lastly, Aris places great reliance upon Fowler v. Setter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 
1992), decided by a panel of the court of appeals of which Judge Orme was a member. 
Aris argues that in Fowler the court of appeals "upheld an award of treble damages for 
loss of and damage to personal property under the forcible detainer statute." Aris unfairly 
and inaccurately criticizes Jude Orme's opinion in the case at bar as being inconsistent 
with his decision in Fowler. [Aris Brief at 19-20] 
Aris overstates the holding in Fowler. In Fowler, the owners of a self-storage 
facility broke the lock on the tenant's unit and removed and sold the tenant's personal 
property. The single defendant at trial admitted liability and the jury awarded damages of 
$7,000. There is no discussion in the opinion of the basis for the $7,000 award and the 
award of compensatory damages was not an issue on appeal. After entry of the verdict, 
the plaintiffs moved for an award of treble damages pursuant to the forcible entry and 
detainer statute. The only objection raised by the landlord was that the tenant had failed 
to endorse the summons pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-8 and that failure allegedly 
barred an award of treble damages. The only issue on appeal was whether the failure to 
endorse the summons barred an award of treble damages.6 838 P.2d at 677. There was 
6
 The court of appeals did not even decide the general question of whether the forcible 
entry statute applied to an uninhabited storage facility because that issue was not before the court. 
[838P.2dat677n.3] 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no issue before the court of appeals as to whether treble damages could be awarded for 
damage to personal property (even assuming that the $7,000 verdict was based upon 
personal property damages) and the court of appeals did not decide such an issue. 
Consequently, Aris's criticism of Judge Orme's opinion in the present case as being 
inconsistent with his opinion in Fowler is baseless. Simply put, Fowler did not consider 
or decide the issue now before this Court. No Utah case has decided this issue. 
C. EVEN IF TREBLE DAMAGES COULD OTHERWISE BE AWARDED 
FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH A 
FORCIBLE DETAINER, TREBLE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 
WHERE THE TENANT HAS ALREADY VACATED THE PREMISES. 
Even if, contrary to what Wasatch and JDJ argue above and in their opening brief, 
this Court concludes for some reason that when a landlord forcibly detains real estate and 
then refuses to turn over possession of the tenant's personal property that the personal 
property damage can be trebled, treble damages should not have been awarded in this 
case. 
As previously explained, the undisputed evidence from Aris's own employees - -
as recited by Aris's counsel in his opening statement and as acknowledged in the 
stipulated facts - - was that Aris went out of business, terminated its employees and shut 
its doors on January 4, 2002 and then turned over possession of the Premises to the 
Doctors to operate their own business on January 7, 2002. Although Aris argues it did 
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not vacate the Premises at that time, it does not challenge this undisputed evidence or 
recite any evidence to support the notion that it continued in possession of the Premises. 
Aris had no use for the Premises, never attempted to reoccupy the Premises and had no 
ability to do so since it had fired all of its employees. 
After Aris went out of business on January 4, at most all the evidence 
demonstrated was that commencing 18 days later, on January 22, Aris wanted to remove 
its equipment. Because Aris did not want to occupy, and could not use, the Premises, 
Aris did not suffer any damages because it did not continue to occupy the real estate; Aris 
did not seek any occupancy damages and Aris was not awarded any such damages. 
Under these circumstances, Aris was not entitled to an award of treble damages for the 
conversion of its personal property found by the trial court which occurred weeks after 
Aris had vacated the Premises. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the court 
of appeals affirming the award of treble damages should be reversed and the Judgment 
modified to eliminate the award of treble damages. 
DATED this of February, 2006. 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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> i •- .. ;j-,; i ;gnt to recover toi ion ible detainer because it was not. seeking 
restu • • ! : ! • • • • • • 'i! '* w'" H'< I I. a judgment for forcible 
detainer "shall include an ordci ior the restitution of the memisrs as (im\ ulnl in '-In I n 
78-36-10.5." [Emphasis Added] See Freeway Park Bldg., 451 P.2d at 275 (the case was 
- ", * > ciainci nccause restiiiin*'i 1 the premises was not SOUL:- r-n 
was instead ior the «".? ' -ecK resiilulni; of the 
Premises at trial and no such relief was granted. Aris did not even, M vi im\ damages on 
(lit h.isi.s it had not been able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that 
Air. li.nl MM use Im Hie hrmi'.i.1, Ans only sought damages i! claimed to have suffered 
because it had not been permitted to take IJ,;. LHUii>illHi« In-HI. the I "remises. 
The treble damages penalty pro\ ided b) ili^ tbrciblc dctainei btaiui 
iitrnicd I, in discourage landlords from fbrciblv dispossessing fcnanis o1 iheir possession of 
real properly. ' ' •- • <.vvttdin v Farrar. ™n V *\! 
468, 470 (Utah 1964). Cf. Keller v. SouthwoodNorth Medu . • " -
 r 
^ I Ttah 1998) (fon ible entry statute only applies to types of prop* »^ *vnr>lc c;t? 
< .
 i;. v< ,. , . . , ..„ ,./r.«. 615P.2d040, 951 fNe\ IWr- , landlord's a>.: 
in vviUuioiding v \ |- - - * - n.i . | \ ucuuning 
real property a tenant is occupyh.&. « * tuiaiiL is relegated to an ad ion Inn nn version <md 
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute simply does not 
apply to ii landlord1!, t limned wiongiul Withholding oi personal property, especiall) after 
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i , : - .jtoMiion i-.\ the IKMC dimapcs 
penu/v would be even more incongruous in the case ; ,,, t ., 
for months in attempting h fr- i ;i replaccmeni tenant and Aris had iiu desire oi auiiw > 
occ up> tl le I "'i ei i lises. 
Ai.'-aiiM- r . . ;. ,s iDl> detaining 
the Equipment on January 22, Wasatch and JDJ also forcibly detail led the Eqi lipi i lei it 
when Peacock changed the locks after tl ic Doctors vacated on Febiuai) >. llowcvci, 
\n\ (MI) lnii}> brum < nliiiiiai ih vacated and abai idoned the Premises and wn»n. 
turned possession of the Prenns*". nvn in t\u> I hn fo(,'< \\ he" Hit I -. . . . , hanged on 
February 9, Aris had not occupied or operated a business on the Premises foi oi 'ei a 
moi ltl l I further, A ris did not have keys to tl le Premises e\ en before the locks were 
. cl lange d so the cl lai lgii lg of 1:1 ic • locks did i lot dispossess A™ -n i^ had no effect 
whatsoever on Aris's ability to occi ipj r the I ¥e:i i lises I ;ii: 
changed, Aris did not request occupancy of the Premises or kev * io die Plenum 
was gr\ ei i, access to tl le I >rei i rises any time it requested for Ihe purpose of inspecting and 
inventorying the Eqi dpi i lei it ai id si IO11 vii: lg it ill :> p i ospective purchasers. [SOFNos, 29 & 
35] 
2. Wrongful Eviction, 
Sin lilarly, becai lse t \ i is 1 lad vacated and abai idoned the Premises on January \ an, 
U , ^ turned over poss< • i - \UUD\ ;,Kadung the T ease. 
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L Forcible Detainer. 
After Aris ceased all business operations, terminated all employees and vacated the 
Premises on January 4 and voluntarily turned over possession of the Premises to the 
doctors on January 7, Aris had no reason or desire to occupy the Premises and had no 
ability to do so. Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do 
so by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible detainer 
statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the withholding of personal 
property.4 Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2. See Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States 
Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969). 
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and 
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965), for the proposition that a landlord can 
be held liable under the forcible detainer statute for seizing a tenant's personal property 
without judicial process. [Appellee's Brief at 31] These cases are not on point because 
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord also refused to 
permit the tenant to remove personal property. Further, the Supreme Court only 
recognized that the tenants had causes of action for conversion of the personal property. 
The Supreme Court did not hold or intimate in either case that treble damages can be 
awarded against a landlord for conversion of the tenant's personal property. 
4
 Aris does not appear to challenge that Wasatch and JDJ raised below the argument that 
the forcible detainer statute only applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not personal 
property. In any event, they clearly did raise this argument. [See, e.g., R. 401-402 fflfa, c & e; 
175-176; 230-231; 305-306; R. 529 at 560-561; 403 p] 
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